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NOTES ON FISSION ENERGY 
K ar l  Cohen 
I. GENERAL REMARKS ON FISSION ENERGY 
Nuclear  f i s s i o n  power i s  unique among man's p o t e n t i a l  f u t u r e  
s o u r c e s  o f  energy  i n  t h e  fo l l owing  combinat ion o f  q u a l i t i e s :  
a )  I t  i s  deployed on a  s u b s t a n t i a l  s c a l e  and an  i n d u s t r y  
and t e c h n i c a l  manpower e x i s t  r e ady  t o  expand i t s  us e ;  
b )  The env i ronmenta l  impact  o f  l a r g e - s c a l e  deployment i s  
less t h a n  t h a t  o f  o t h e r  a l r e a d y  deployed energy sou rc e s ;  
c )  I t  o f f e r s  a  p o t e n t i a l  i n e x h a u s t i b l e  supp ly  o f  energy  
by wel l -unders tood  technology;  
d )  I ts  f u e l  i s  h i g h l y  c o n c e n t r a t e d  and t h u s  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  
i s  n o t  a  h i n d r ance  t o  i t s  u s e  any p l a c e  a n  t h e  g lobe ,  
i n c l u d i n g  underwater ;  
e)  Nuclear  elect r ic  power i s  g e n e r a l l y  economical  compared 
t o  c o n v e n t i o n a l  f o s s i l  power s t a t i o n s .  
I t  a l s o  h a s  un ique  drawbacks: 
a )  The g e n e r a t i o n  o f  f i s s i o n  power i s  accompanied by t h e  
p r o d u c t i o n  o f  r a d i a t i o n  s i x  o r d e r s  o f  magnitude l a r g e r  
t h a n  any o t h e r  human a c t i v i t y ;  
b,) F i s s i o n  r e a c t i o n s  -use  a s  f u e l ,  and have a s  p r o d u c t s ,  
t h e  m a t e r i a l s  o f  man's  d e a d l i e s t  weapons; 
c )  Because o f  t h e s e  t w o  c i r cums tances  f i s s i o n  power i s  sub- 
j e c t  t o  unprecedented governmenta l  r e g u l a t i o n ,  based  on 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y ,  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  and 
h e a l t h  and s a f e t y ;  
d )  F u r t h e r ,  because  o f  a )  and b )  it a r o u s e s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
p u b l i c  apprehens ion  which can  e a s i l y  b e  t u r n e d  i n t o  
h o s t i l i t y .  
The drawbacks make many people reluctant to commit un- 
reservedly to the nuclear o?tion, so lonff as the urgency of 
oomrnitting to any major energy option is not clear to them, and 
so long as the hope exists that one could have all the benefits 
of nuclear power without any of the drawbacks--for instance 
fusion by the D-D reaction or some technicaljeconomic break- 
through in solac -power. 
Global energy requirements by the year 2030 may be so high 
and the institutional, capital and production-organizational 
requirements to meet this demand so severe, that the time for 
choices and commitments cannot be postponed much longer. Thus, 
we must indicate what possibilities exist to meet a substantial 
part of this future demand with nuclear fission power. We do 
not here argue the risk/benefit ratio of the nuclear option 
compared to other options. What we do here is present what we 
believe are feasible nuclear options, granted a decision to 
exercise them is made by 1985-1990. 
What is feasible depends on the frame of reference. In a 
war-time mobilization many things are possible which cannot be 
accomplished by business-as-usual. The pnxpose of planning, 
however, is to avoid, as much as possible, the necessity for 
crash programs to make up for a lack of foresight. We may not 
be able to attain our goals by business-as-usual, but it should 
be our ambition to depart from it as little as possible: to 
make plans which work with and not against normal economic 
forces and normal economic rhythms. 
In determining what is feasible, we assume political and 
social constraints--such as prohibitions on recovery and reuse 
of plutonium--to be removed. But we take account of the 
practical constraints of men, materials, economies, information 
(technology) and organization. It will turn out that the more 
ambitious the energy program, the more constrained the nuclear 
options are. (Obviously, in the other extreme, where little 
nuclear power is needed, any option is feasible.) 
11. NUCLEAR TARGETS AND TRAJECTORIES 
Targets 
We consider two alternative requirements for nuclear power, 
taking for definiteness the year 2030 as our target year. 
Corresponding to a 35 TW high and 24 TW low scenario for world 
primary energy demand (oil equivalent basis) in 2030, we choose 
8 TWe and 4 TWe of nuclear power for.that year. Somewhat 
arbitrarily, we assume further growth past 2030 to be at 100 GWe/ 
yr, and 50 GWe/yr, respectively. 
Aside from the use of solar energy for space and hot-water 
heating, which are real but minor constituents of final energy, 
the principal secondary energy sources are liquid fuels and 
electricity. Any global energy option--nuclear fission, nuclear 
fusion , coal, or solar energy--must be converted into elec- 
tricity or liquid fuels to meet the bulk of mankind's needs. 
So far--aside from trivial district heating application--nuclear 
fission power has been applied only to generate electricity in 
central power plants. It has been postulated that this is the 
likely future path for nuclear fission. Others have postulated 
large application as high temperature process heat suppliers. 
Experimentation on gas reforming has been underway. We are 
proposing in this paper a synthesis of these ideas. Some 
nuclear energy will be marketed as secondary energy in the form 
of electricity: some as liquid or gaseous fuels. There are a 
number of ways in which nuclear energy may produce liquid or 
gaseous fuels in addition to high temperature process heat. 
The efficiency of transformation of nuclear energy into 
fluid fuels varies someid-rat between these various applications. 
To fix our ideas, we select 3 TWeyr/yr of electricity for the 
grid, and 5 TWeyr/yr f o r  fluid fuel production via electrolysis. 
Power systems traditionally have run at 55% of peak 
capability or 66% of capability excluding reserve. Base-loaded 
fossil and nuclear plants approximate this latter figure. Part 
of the difference between 66 and 100% is attributable to lack 
of system demand, and part to unavailability because of plant 
outages for maintenance and (for the nuclear plants) refueling. 
We assume that nuclear plants used to generate electricity for 
distribution on grids will improve to 75% load factor, and that 
plants which generate electricity for production of liquid fuels 
run 10 points higher or 85% load factor. Then if 3 TWe are used 
for electricity and 5 TWe for liquid fuels, the total installed 
capability needed would be -10,000 GWe in 2030. 
Similarly, for the 4 TWe scenario, a total of 5000 GWe 
installed capability is required. 
Definition of Present Nuclear Energy Trajectory 
The nuclear report to the Conservation Committee of the 
World Energy Conference [I] presents the following projections: 
Table I. Projected world iiuclear power installations (GV?e) 
Regional Grouping 1975 1985 2000 2020 
1. OECD 68 247 955 2423 
2. Centrally Planned 
Economies 7 3 3 402 1610 
3. Remainder 1 23 186 1000 
Total 76 303 1543 5033 
The figures are based on an extrapolation of present pro- 
grams and plans of nuclear power plant construction. Of interest 
to us is only the trajectory estimated to 2000  (we do not make 
use of the estimate shown for 2 0 3 0 ) .  For the period 1975-2000 
the figures are less than previous OECD forecasts [ 2 1  and repre- 
sent in large measure a response to conservationist pressure on 
energy growth in general and on nuclear energy in particular. 
The acceleration in nuclear installations shown between 1985  
and 2000  in the Centrally Planned Economies, and in the Remainder 
of the World, seems excessive. It does not correspond with 
presently published plans [ 3 ]  which show a target of - 4 0  GWe 
in the CMEA countries for 1993;  or to any established program in 
the U.S.S.R., which, because of its enormous fossil reserves, 
has never adopted as ambitious a construction program as the 
OECD. We therefore adjust downward the projection for 2 0 0 0  by 
-200  GWe to 1 3 5 0  GWe. Extrapolating between 1 9 8 5  and 2000  with 
a smooth curve we obtain 900  GWe in 1 9 9 5  and 540  GWe in 1 9 9 0  to 
give the following appraisal of the present tranjectory. 
Table 11. Estimated world nuclear power installations (GWe) 
(present trajectory) 
Cumulative 76  1 5 0  3 0 0  540 9 0 0  1 3 5 0  
Annual average 1 5  3 5  50 7 0  9 0  
Possible Accelerated Trajectories 
The maximum number of nuclear plants which can be completed 
in 1 9 8 5  is nearly impossible to change. Indeed it is likely 
that all plants which will actually be operating in 1 9 9 0  are 
already in some stage of planning. Even assuming (as we do) 
a resolution of the present social, political and economic un- 
certainties surrounding nuclear power in the OECD countries by 
1985, it wou<ld still be some time before the number of nuclear 
plants installed could be increased above those presently planned. 
A study "Resource Ileeds for Nuclear power 5rowth" undertaken 
in 1972 /73  by the Atomic Industrial Forum [41  calculated that an 
acceleration program begun in 1 9 7 3  could increase the number of 
additions (in the U.S.) between 1980  and 1 9 8 5  from 154  GWe to 
220 GWe, thus increasing the average rate of additions approxi- 
mately 1 0  years later by about 50%. There are many differences 
between the case examined by the AIF and the present U.S. situa- 
tion. The reference case called for a vigorous nuclear growth 
to 500  GWe in 1990,  while the present trajectory is directed 
towards 200  GWe for the same year. It is generally agreed that 
the nuclear industry in the OECD nations is operating below its 
theoretical capacity. It is probably easier to increase 
c a p a c i t y  a d d i t i o n s  from t h e  p r e s e n t  low r a t e ,  t h a n  from t h e  h igh  
r a t e  assumed i n  t h e  AIF s t udy .  Neve r the l e s s  it would be  un- 
r e a l i s t i c  t o  e x p e c t  one  cou ld  change t h e  p r e s e n t  U.S. t r a j e c t o r y  
(which i s  17+3 GWe/year a d d i t i o n s  ove r  t h e  p e r i o d  1990-2000) t o  
more t h a n  40 GWe/yr i n  t h e  same p e r i o d ,  even a f t e r  removal o f  
a l l  p u b l i c  c o n s t r a i n t s  by 1985. 
I n  t h e  wor ld  o u t s i d e  o f  OECD t h e r e  a r e  a  few ev idences  o f  
a r t i f i c i a l  c o n s t r a i n t  on n u c l e a r  power growth. Thus it i s  un- 
l i k e l y  t h a t  a n  a c c e l e r a t i o n  program cou ld  doub l e  t h e  r a t e  of  
n u c l e a r  a d d i t i o n s  i n  t h e  p e r i o d  1995-2000 f o r  t h e  wor ld  a s  a  
whole. I t  i s  o u r  judgment t h a t  a n  a c c e l e r a t i o n  program dec ided  
on i n  1985 c o u l d  i n c r e a s e  t h e  growth o f  n u c l e a r  power s t a t i o n s  
f o r  t h e  p e r i o d  1995-2000 from t h e  f o r e c a s t  -90 GWe/year t o  a t  
most  -150 GWe/year. 
P r e l i m i n a r y  Genera l  Comments on  t h e  10,000 GWe and 
5,000 G W e  T a r g e t s  
Fo r  t h e  apper  t a r g e t  o f  10,000 GWe i n  2030, c o u n t i n g  re- 
placements  f o r  t h e  900 GWe expec ted  t o  be  i n  o p e r a t i o n  by 1995, 
w e  a r e  f a c e d  w i t h  b u i l d i n g  10,000 GWe i n  35 y e a r s ,  o r  300 GWe/yr 
average .  T h i s  migh t  be  ach ieved  by s t a r t i n g  a t  t h e  r a t e  of 
150 GBe/yr i n  1995, and end ing  a t  pe rhaps  450 GWe/yr i n  2030. 
A p r i o r i ,  a n  a c c e l e r a t i o n  o f  c o n s t r u c t i o n  r a t e s  by a f a c t o r  of  
3 o v e r  30 y e a r s ,  g i v e n  t h a t  o u r  p r e s e n t  t r a j e c t o r y  i s  schedu led  
t o  m u l t i p l y  a d d i t i o n s  by a lmos t  t h i s  f a c t o r  i n  15 y e a r s ,  appea r s  
t o  be  an  a c h i e v a b l e  o b j e c t i v e .  The number of  p l a n t s  and power 
s t a t i o n  sites w i l l  grow more s lowly  t h a n  t h e  number of  GVTe.; a s  
w e  dep loy  l a r g e  power s t a t i o n s  w i t h  m u l t i p l e  u n i t s  ( say  4 , ,  and 
i n c r e a s e  u n i t  o u t p u t s  by modest f a c t o r s  ( - 2 ) .  
I t  i s  when w e  come t o  t h e  mix o f  r e a c t o r  t y p e s  t h a t  t h e  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r i s e .  The fo l l owing  q u o t a t i o n  from t h e  WEC r e p o r t  
[ I ]  i s  worth  no t i ng :  
I n  1975 t h e  w o r l d ' s  i n s t a l l e d  c a p a c i t y  was 76 GWe,  o f  
which 80% was p rov ided  by l i g h t  wa t e r  r e a c t o r s ,  121 
by g a s - g r a p h i t e  r e a c t o r s ,  and 4 %  by heavy w a t e r  
r e a c t o r s ,  a l l  o f  which o p e r a t e  on t h e  once-through 
uranium c y c l e ,  where U-235 i s  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  f i s s i o n i n g  
i s o t o p e .  The remaining 4 %  o f  t h e  c a p a c i t y  was pro- 
v ided  by p r o t o t y p e s  o f  t h e  l i q u i d  meta l -cooled  f a s t  
b r eede r  r e a c t o r  (LMFBR) and by h igh- tempera tu re  gas-  
coo l ed  r e a c t o r s  (HTGR) . 
Obviously  n u c l e a r  power w i l l  grow i n  d i f f e r e n t  ways i n  
d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s  b u t  m o s t  of t h e  growth i n d i c a t e d  
i n  Tab l e  I w i l l  come from t e c h n o l o g i e s  which a r e  a l r e a d y  
known. 
The t a s k  of  b u i l d i n g  l a r g e  numbers o f  power s t a t i o n s  i s  of  
c o u r s e  t h e  e a s i e r  t h e  more t h e  l a t e r  power p l a n t s  r esemble  
t h o s e  w i t h  which w e  have a l r e a d y  acqu i r ed  s i g n i f i c a n t  o p e r a t i n g  
expe r i ence ,  and have e s t a b l i s h e d  a n  i n f r a - s t r u c t u r e  of  
developed t echno logy ,  e x i s t i n g  manufac tu r ing  and p r o c e s s i n g  
f a c i l i t i e s ,  t r a i n e d  manpower, and a  l i c e n s i n g  and r e g u l a t o r y  
framework. Thus t h e r e  i s  a  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  problem t o  
b u i l d i n g  150 GWe/yr o f  l i g h t  w a t e r  r e a c t o r s  i n  1995, g i v e n  
t h a t  o u r  p r e s e n t  peak c a p a c i t y  i s  o v e r  40 GWe/yr, and b u i l d i n g  
s u b s t a n t i a l  numbers o f  r e a c t o r s  which may n o t  b e  f u l l y  developed 
and deployed commercia l ly  b e f o r e  2000. T h i s  a p p l i e s  e q u a l l y  t o  
LMFBRs, HTGRs,  and o t h e r  advanced c o n c e p t s ,  and t o  a  lesser 
e x t e n t  t o  ma jor  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  o f  developed r e a c t o r s ,  s u c h  a s  
changes  i n  f u e l  o r  f u e l  c y c l e s .  
From t h e s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  it i s  e v i d e n t  t h a t  from t h e  
s t a n d p o i n t s  o f  commit t ing  hardware  o f  known performance  and on 
some p r e d i c t a b l e  c o s t  b a s i s  (even i f  it i s  o n l y  a n  e x t r a p o l a t i o n  
from p a s t  e x p e r i e n c e )  t h e  most  p r a c t i c a l  way t o  b u i l d  up t o  
10,000 GWe o f  n u c l e a r  power would b e  t o  b u i l d  LWRs w i t h  a  once- 
th rough  f u e l  c y c l e .  However t h i s  r u n s  i n t o  a n o t h e r  o b s t a c l e :  
it r e q u i r e s  a n  i n d e f i n i t e l y  i n c r e a s i n g  s u p p l y  of  e n r i c h e d  
uranium f u e l .  
E n r i c h i n g  t h e  uranium i s  n o t  a  major  o b s t a c l e .  S e v e r a l  
t e c h n o l o g i e s  a l r e a d y  e x i s t  which a r e  adequa te ;  c a p i t a l  i n v e s t -  
ments  i n  e n r i c h i n g  p l a n t s  a r e  a  minor p e r t u r b a t i o n  on c a p i t a l  
i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  t h e  power p l a n t s  t h e y  s e r v e ;  and t h e r e  i s  p r o s p e c t  
f o r  c o n t i n u e d  t e c h n i c a l  and economic improvement i n  b o t h  e s t a b -  
l i s h e d  and new enr ichment  methods.  
Opinions  d i f f e r  w i d e l y  a b o u t  t h e  u l t i m a t e  q u a n t i t y  o f  
uranium which c a n  b e  e x t r a c t e d  economica l ly .  Many c o s t - b e n e f i t  
a n a l y s e s  by FBR p r o p o n e n t s  have  assumed a  f i n i t e  uranium re- 
s o u r c e ,  a c c a s i o n a l l y  a s  low a s  1.7 m i l l i o n  t o n s  o f  U i n  t h e  U.S. 
and -3.7 m i l l i o n  t o n s  i n  t h e  wor ld  [ 5 ] .  Opponents o f  t h e  FBZ 
and t h o s e  opposed t o  chemica l  r e p r o c e s s i n g  on t h e  grounds  of  
t h e  danger  of  n u c l e a r  weapons p r o l i f e r a t i o n  a r e  more o p t i m i s t i c  
a b o u t  uranium r e s o u r c e s .  Even w i t h i n  t h e  n u c l e a r  i n d u s t r y  
t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  unanimi ty .  Some m a i n t a i n  t h e  p e r i o d i c  DOE 
r e p o r t s  o n  wor ld  r e s o u r c e s  (which show world r e s o u r c e s  up t o  
nominal c o s t  o f  $50 / lb  ye l lowcake  t o  b e  q u i t e  l i m i t e d  (-5 m i l l i o n  
t o n s ) ) ,  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  o n l y  p r u d e n t  p l a n n i n g  b a s e ,  w h i l e  o t h e r s ,  
u s i n g  mathemat ica l  and s t a t i s t i c a l  models,  a r e  c o n f i d e n t  t h a t  
und i scovered  r e c o v e r a b l e  r e s o u r c e s  i n  t h e  t e n s  and hundreds  o f  
m i l l i o n  t o n s  e x i s t .  
The WEC p a p e r ,  and more r e c e n t l y  t h e  CONAES s t u d y  [5 ]  stress 
a  d i f f e r e n t  problem: c a n  t h e  r a t e  o f  uranium e x t r a c t i o n  b e  in -  
c r e a s e d  t o  match a  demand growing from -25,000 t o n n e s  U/year i n  
1975 t o  o v e r  200,000 t o n n e s / y r  i n  20007 Note t h a t  a t  a n  a v e r a g e  
o r e  g r a d e  bf 0.1% U 3 0 8 ,  which i s  expec ted  t o  p r e v a i l  i n  1990, 
200,000 tonnes /y r  U r e q u i r e s  e x t r a c t i n g  250,000,000 t o n n e s  o f  
o r e  p e r  y e a r .  I f  one  c o n s i d e r s  more d i l u t e  r e s o u r c e s  such  a s  
t h e  Chat tanooga s h a l e s  (50-60 ppm) t h e  mining e f f o r t  p e r  u n i t  o f  
p r imary  energy  produced i n  l i g h t  w a t e r  r e a c t o r s  i s  a b o u t  t h e  
same a s  t h a t  f o r  c o a l .  
I n  a  s i t u a t i o n  where many e x p e r t s  d i f f e r  it i s  n o t  appro-  
p r i a t e  t o  b e  dogmat ic .  W e  t h e r e f o r e  must  f a c e  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  
of  b o t h  a  l i m i t e d  and u n l i m i t e d  r e s o u r c e  base .  
Definition of Scenarios to be Studied 
Reliance on natural uranium mining to the extent required 
by a scenario of all light water reactors with approximately 
present resource requirements cannot be excluded as a logical 
possibility, but it depends on unprovable assumptions about 
resource availability, is clearly wasteful of natural resources, 
requires a massive mining effort and for this reason is not 
readily adaptable to changed requirements. Therefore it is not 
a prudent planning base for a global nuclear option, even if 
uranium is available in indefinitely large amounts. 
Possible alternative scenarios to remedy the excessive 
dependence on uranium mining of present LWR operations range 
from 
I. Ultimately replacing LWRs with another reactor type 
or types which are more economical of uranium; 
11. modifying LWRs to reduce their resource consumption 
significantly (factor of at least two); 
111. supplementing LWRs with FBRs which can replenish 
their fuel, supply (LWRs are modified as little as 
possible). 
A combination of these three scenarios is likely to occur, 
but they will be considered separately to clarify the advantages 
and disadvantages of each. 
Let us examine more closely Scenario I, to illustrate the 
method of analysis which will be used on all scenarios. Changing 
to a new reactor type (e.g. HTGR) requires proving out the design 
of a large plant through the demonstration stage, building up an 
an industry to supply it, constructing fabrication and repro- 
cessing plants for its fuel, and so forth. It will not be 
possible to change overnight from an industry which is producing 
substantial numbers of LWRs to one which is deploying the same 
number of HTGRs. Thus unless we continue to build LWRs, we shall 
fall hopelessly behind in our attempt to meet the target amounts 
of nuclear power. We end up with a mixed reactor economy which 
can be evaluated in terms of its economics and resource require- 
ments. A key question is how fast can one technology replace 
another in a given market. This will be investigated at some 
length from a number of different points of view. 
In Scenario I we envisage ultimately replacing LWRs. In 
Scenarios I1 and I11 we do not replace LWRs, but try to remedy 
their deficiencies. The boundary between the modifications to 
LWRs envisaged in Scenarios I1 and I11 is not clear cut. The 
LWBR would clearly belong in Scenario 11. Using a Pu-U oxide 
core, with Pu produced by an FBR, is clearly Scenario 111. An 
LWR modified to use U-233/Th fuel could be in either scenario, 
depending on how easily the modification could be backfitted in 
existing reactors. The major distinction between Scenario I1 
and Scenario I11 is the introduction of FBRs in Scenario 111. 
111. INTRODUCTION OF NEW NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES: 
HISTORICAL INFERENCES 
In evaluating scenarios, we will have to make projections 
of the rates at which conventional LWRs can be built, at which 
modified LWRs can be built, and at which reactors not based on 
LWR technology can be built. We shall approach this problem in 
three ways: by looking at the history of reactor commercial- 
ization, by estimating a priori the time required for new de- 
velopments to be completed and for a supply industry to be 
created, and by using economic models to account for observed 
regularities in replacement of new products and technologies for 
old ones. 
History of Introduction of LWRs 
General Observations 
The development of water-cooled reactor for commercial use 
had its roots in technologies and large-scale installations 
previously established for military purposes. Mines and mills 
for the production and purification of uranium, and gaseous 
diffusion plants for the enrichment of U-235, were available on 
a.scale which would not be reached by the requirements of the 
civilian power industry for two decades. 
The Introduction of LWRs in the U.S. 
Table 1 shows the annual installations and cumulative in- 
stallations of LWRs in the U.S. from 1957 to 1977 [61. 
Table 2 shows the scheduled installed capacity from 1978- 
1987 as they were reported in early 1977. This represents an 
upper bound of future installed capacities. 
As of mid-year 1.978 it appeared likely that this schedule 
would be substantially underrun. Table 3 is a reported DOE 
projection [7] . 
It now appears highly unlikely that the national Energy 
Policy goal can be exceeded. 
One can identify from Table 1 four distinct periods. From 
1960-1962 a number of demonstration plants whose average size 
was -200 MWe were installed in the U.S. The plants were pre- 
economic and partly subsidized by the utilities, the manufac- 
turers, and the government. During 1963-1967 operating ex- 
perience with the demonstration plants was accumulated and fed 
back into the design of a number of commercial plants of the size 
range 500-800 MWe committed and under construction in this period. 
From 1968-1972 these first fully commercial plants were brought 
into operation. During the same period many commitments for even 
larger plants ( 8 0 0 - 1 1 0 0  YWe) were made. After '1973 a con~lex of 
circumstances caused utility projections of load growth to drop 
from 7-8%/year to 4.5-6$/year. Some of these circumstances 
Table 1. Installation of LWRs in the U.S. (historical) 
Year ~nstalled/year Average size Cumulative % 
No. GWe MWe No. GWe 
Table 2. Installation of LWRs in the U.S. (owner's schedules) 
- - - - 
Year Ins talled/year (GWe) Cumulation (GWe) 
Table 3 .  Pre l imina ry  DOE p r o j e c t i o n  of cumulat ive  LWR 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s  i n  t h e  U . S .  
Year Low Reference High Nat iona l  Energy 
P o l i c y  Goal 
were: an economic down.turn, i nc reased  environmental  concerns ,  
e l e c t r i c i t y  p r i c e  rises from suddenly inc reased  p r i c e s  of f o s s i l  
f u e l s ,  conS t ruc t ion  c o s t  i n f l a t i o n ,  consumer r e s i s t a n c e  t o  
f u r t h e r  e l e c t r i c i t y  p r i c e  i n c r e a s e s ,  and consequent u t i l i t y  
f i n a n c i a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  A s  a r e s u l t  t h e  u t i l i t i e s  s t r e t c h e d  
o u t  t h e i r  c o n s t r u c t i o n  schedules  i n  t h e  per iod  1974-1978, and 
nuc lea r  (and f o s s i l  a s  w e l l )  power p l a n t  i n s t a l l a t i o n  r a t e s  
stopped growing. 
Applying t h i s  p a t t e r n  mechanical ly  t o  p r o j e c t  t h e  f u t u r e  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  a new r e a c t o r  technology may n o t  b e  p roduc t ive ,  
s i n c e  t h e r e  w e r e  s o  many s p e c i a l  c i rcumstances  which w i l l  n o t  
be  repea ted .  I t  is  more rewarding t o  cons ide r  t h e  conc lus ions  
drawn from t h i s  exper ience  by t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  
I t  w i l l  be  noted t h a t  some o p e r a t i n g  exper ience  f ~ o m  t h e  
200 M W e  r e a c t o r  g e n e r a t i o n  was ob ta ined  b e f o r e  t h e  -650 M W e  
gene ra t ion  was committed. Subsequent p l a n t  commitments grad- 
u a l l y  e s c a l a t e d  i n  s i z e .  The assumption w a s  made t h a t  o p e r a t i n g  
exper ience  from somewhat s m a l l e r  r e a c t o r s  would b e  a v a i l a b l e  
i n  a t imely  manner t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  des ign  of t h e  l a r g e r  p l a n t s .  
Th i s  e x p e c t a t i o n  was o n l y  p a r t l y  f u l f i l l e d .  The u n a n t i c i p a t e d  
ex t ens ion  of c o n s t r u c t i o n  schedules  beginning i n  -1970 was a 
p r i n c i p a l  f a c t o r  i n  t h i s  d e l a y  i n  o p e r a t i n g  exper ience .  F u r t h e r ,  
t h e r e  was a r a p i d  e v o l u t i o n  of  s t anda rds ,  a c c e l e r a t e d  by con- 
t i n u a l l y  e s c a l a t i n g  p u b l i c  concern over  r e a c t o r  s a f e t y .  The 
slow c o n s t r u c t i o n  schedules  and t h e  r a p i d  changes of  s t a n d a r d s  
r e s u l t e d  i n  much r edes ign  and b a c k f i t t i n g .  I t  i s  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  
vendors o r  owners w i l l  expose themselves aga in  t o  t h i s  k ind of  
t e c h n i c a l  and economic r i s k .  W e  a n t i c i p a t e  t h a t  f u t u r e  changes 
i n  p l a n t  s i z e s  and des ign  parameters  w i l l  be more d e l i b e r a t e ,  
and commitment of numbers of p l a n t s  a t  a  g iven  performance l e v e l  
w i l l  w a i t  f o r  a c t u a l  ( r a t h e r  t han  scheduled)  o p e r a t i o n  exper ience .  
I n  s h o r t  t h e  concept  of s t anda rd i zed  p l a n t s ,  which has  been 
merely an o r a t o r i c a l  c l i c h g  f o r  a decade,  w i l l  be  s e r i o u s l y  
app l i ed .  
The I n t r o d u c t i o n  of  LFJRs i n  t h e  World a s  a Whole 
Table 4 e x h i b i t s  t h e  h i s t o r y  of  t h e  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  of LWRs 
(PWs,  BWs, and LWGRs) i n  t h e  world a s  a whale. Comparing it 
Table 4. Installation of water-cooled reactors in world 
(historical, includes PWRs, BWRs, LTt?GFts) 
- -  - - 
Year Installed/year Average size Cumulative 
No. GWe MWe Yo. GWe 
with Table 1, it will be observed that in the years 1964 through 
1968 a number of demonstration plants of approximately 250 MWe 
capacity similar to those installed in the U.S. between 1960 and 
1962, were installed outside the U.S. In Western Europe and 
Japan larger plants, similar to those which began operating in 
the U.S. in 1968 and 1969, were brought on line in 1971 and 
1972. 
The Soviet Union carried out an independent line of devel0~- 
ment. A period of experimentation with various plant types of 
small sizes led eventually to the serial production of 440 MW 
PWZs, the first (Novo-Voronezh-3) becoming operational in 1972: 
and to serial production of 1000-MW LIfGRs (light water-cooled 
graphite-moderated reactor), the first (Leningrad-1) becoming 
operational in g974. The 440 MW PWRs are being built in the 
European CMEA countries as well as in the U.S.S,R. 
The S o v i e t  PWR development showed a  f i v e - y e a r  h i a t u s  
between t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  Voronezh-1 (210 M W e )  and Voronezh-2 
(365 M W e ) ,  and t h r e e  y e a r s  between Voronezh-2 and Voronezh-3. 
M u l t i p l e  u n i t s  o f  440 MWe were however committed w i t h o u t  pro-  
v i s i o n  f o r  extended o p e r a t i n g  e x p e r i e n c e  on  t h e  f i r s t  one. 
The f i r s t  1000 M W e  PWR (Voronezh-5) i s  schedu led  f o r  1978, s i x  
y e a r s  a f t e r  Voronezh-3. S t a n d a r d i z a t i o n  i s  a l r e a d y  i n  p r a c t i c e  
i n  t h e  USSR. 
A s i g n i f i c a n t  development by t h e  USSR i s  c o n s t r u c t i o n  nea r  
Volgodonsk o f  t h e  Atommash heavy n u c l e a r  component f a c t o r y ,  
which i s  n e a r i n g  complet ion .  I t  i s  planned t o  produce  com-  
ponen ts  f o r  8000 M W e  i n  i t s  f i r s t  y e a r  o f  o p e r a t i o n .  Another  
development i n  t h e  same s e n s e  i s  a n  qgreement whereby t h e  
C.S.S.R. w i l l  c o n s t r u c t  steel  f u r n a c e s  o f  24,000 t o n s / y r  t o  
produce  heavy f o r g i n g s  f o r  n u c l e a r  p l a n t s .  
F u t u r e  R a t e s  o f  Growth o f  Nuclear  Power P l a n t s  
I n  p r e l i m i n a r y  g e n e r a l  comments on  t h e  10,000 GWe and 
5,000 GWe t a r g e t s ,  w e  v en t u r ed  t h e  o p i n i o n  t h a t  c o n s t r u c t i n g  
an a v e r a g e  o f  300 GWe/yr o f  conven t i ona l  LWRs i n  t h e  35 y e a r s  
from 1995-2030 appeared a c h i e v a b l e .  t h i s  w a s  based on t h e  
assumpt ion t h a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  t r a j e c t o r y ,  which r e q u i r e s  a  con- 
s t r u c t i o n  rate of  90 GWe/yr i n  1995-2000, c a n  and w i l l  b e  
ach ieved .  Tab l e  4 ,  however, shows t h a t  t h e  maximum r a t e  o f  
a d d i t i o n  s o  f a r  ach ieved  h a s  been 15 GWe. 
One c an n o t  a s s e r t  t h a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  t r a j e c t o r y  w i l l  be  
ach ieved .  The fo l l .owing argument s u p p o r t s  t h e  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  
it c a n  be .  
-
Most of  t h e  p l a n t s  which a r e  schedu led  t o  come i n t o  
o p e r a t i o n  between 1980 and 1985 a r e  a l r e a d y  under c o n s t r u c t i o n  
and a t  l e a s t  t h e  beg inn ing  o f  f a b r i c a t i o n  o f  equipment h a s  been 
made f o r  t h e  rest. 30 GWe/yr f o r  1980-1985 seems on c a p a c i t y  
t o  produce  p r e s s u r e - v e s s e l s ,  f a b r i c a t e  f u e l  e lements ,  etc.  
The U.S. n u c l e a r  i n d u s t r y  p r e s e n t  c a p a c i t y  i s  e s t i m a t e d  as 
25-30 GWe/yr. Adding t h e  c a p a c i t i e s  i n  Western Europe, Japan ,  
and t h e  CMEA c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  LITR hardware ca?ac i t y  (exc lud ing  
uranium p r o d u c t i o n )  of  t h e  wor ld  appea r s  t o  b e  no less t h a n  
49 GWe/yr. 
The annua l  inc rement  o f  power p l a n t  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  
wor ld  i s  a b o u t  100 ~ ~ e / y r .  A t  a  growth r a t e  o f  t o t a l  e lec t r ic  
power o f  o n l y  4%/year ,  t h e  annua l  inc rement  w i l l  become i n  
2000, -235 GWe/yr. I t  shou ld  n o t  be  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  t h e  n u c l e a r  
i n d u s t r y ,  t o  keep up w i t h  it and t o  r e a c h  90 GWe/yr. 
I n c i d e n t a l l y ,  t h e  r a t i o  40:100 s e r v e s  t o  remind u s  o f  t h e  
impor tance  o f  t h e  n u c l e a r  i n d u s t r y  t o  t h e  w o r l d ' s  power economy, 
and t h e  d i s a s t e r  which would b e  i n f l i c t e d  i f  i t  w e r e  al lowed 
t o  decay.  
In fe rences  from His to ry  
To sum up, a t t a inmen t  of a  nuc lear  hardware c a p a c i t y  of 
t h e  o r d e r  of 1500 GWe by t h e  yea r  2000, based on LWR p l a n t s  
whose technology was demanstrated i n  t h e  e a r l y  60s and became 
commercial i n  t h e  l a t e  60s,  appears  an a t t a i n a b l e  g o a l .  Reserva- 
t i o n s  must be expressed about  t h e  a b i l i t y  of t h e  uranium 
i n d u s t r y  t o  f u e l  t h e s e  r e a c t o r s  a t  t h e  r a t e  c a l l e d  f o r  (-200,000 
tons/year  of yellow-cake, f o r  a  once-through f u e l  c y c l e  i n  LWRs, 
even assuming a  30% improvement i n  f u e l  economy). 
I t  would a l s o  seem reasonable  t o  i n f e r  t h a t  a  new tech-  
nology, commercial by 1995, which would o f f e r  t h e  same ad- 
van tage  over  LWRs t h a t  LWRs o f f e r e d  over  f o s s i l  p l a n t s ,  would 
be a b l e  t o  be b u i l t  t o  a t  l e a s t  t h i s  l e v e l  (1500 GWe) by 2030. 
Th i s  should be a l l  t h e  e a s i e r  because of t h e  f a r  l a r g e r  world 
economy p o s t  2000. (An i n f l u e n c e  i n  t h e  o t h e r . . d i r e c t i o n  i s  
t h a t  i n  t h e  60s it was p o s s i b l e  t o  commit and complete a  nuc l ea r  
p l a n t  i n  5  o r  6  y e a r s ,  and it now t a k e s  about  twice  t h a t . )  
One l i m i t a t i o n  on t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  new t echno log ie s  i s  
t h e  t ime it t a k e s  t o  b r i d g e  t h e  gap between succuess fu l  develop- 
ment and t h e  f i r s t  commercial i n s t a l l a t i o n .  We a r e  concerned 
he re ,  n o t  w i th  t h e  long pe r iod  of b a s i c  technology development, 
which beg ins  w i th  loops  and i n - p i l e  experiments i n  t e s t  
r e a c t o r s ,  b a s i c  m a t e r i a l s  and phys i c s  exper iments ,  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
of p i l o t  p l a n t s ,  and f i n a l l y  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  of one o r  more smal l  
(<300 M W e )  demonstra t ion r e a c t o r s ,  b u t  w i t h  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  
per iod  t o  l a r g e ,  commercially l i c e n s e d  s t anda rd  p l a n t s .  Th i s  
i s  t h e  s t a g e  t h a t  t h e  HTGR, t h e  LMFBR, o r  a  re -des ign  of CANDU 
t o  use  enr iched  uranium, would s t i l l  have ahead. Oblier r e a c t o r s -  
-such a s  t h e  GCFBR, o r  t h e  molten s a l t  reactor--have n o t  y e t  
reached t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  s t a g e .  
We envisage  t h e  fo l lowing  scenar io :  a - l a r g e  p l a n t  (-1000- 
1500 MWe) i s  designed and b u i l t .  R e a l  c o s t  exper ience  i s  ob- 
t a i n e d .  The p l a n t  i s  ope ra t ed  long enough f o r  a  s t anda rd  
burn-up o f  a t  l e a s t  p a r t  of t h e  f i r s t  load .  P o s t - i r r a d i a t i o n  
examination of t h e  f u e l  conf i rms t h e  expected neu t ron  economy 
of t h e  r e a c t o r  and t h e  i n t e g r i t y  of t h e  f u e l .  T h i s  p roces s  
w i l l  t a k e  from 8-10 y e a r s ,  a t  t h e  conc lus ion  of which one could 
i n  p r i n c i p l e  deploy wi th  conf idence  any number of t h e  same 
r e a c t o r  des ign .  I f  one  wanted t o  deploy a l a r g e r  r e a c t o r  ( s ay  
2000-3000 GWe) t h e  same procedure  would be  fol lowed,  less t h e  
p o s t - i r r a d i a t i o n  examinat ion of t h e  f u e l  which might be d i s -  
pensed with .  This  c y c l e  would be of 7-9 yea r s .  
The nex t  l i m i t a t i o n  on deployment would then  be t h e  ra te  
a t  which an i n d u s t r y ,  i n c l u d i n g  a n c i l l a r y  f a c i l i t i e s ,  cou ld  be 
mobi l ized.  (The second l i m i t a t i o n ,  which w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  a t  
l e n g t h  below, would be t h e  economic i n c e n t i v e  t o  do s o . )  Based 
on h i s t o r y ,  t h e  t ime it t a k e s  t o  i n c r e a s e  produc t ion  rates 
from one o r  two p l a n t s / y e a r  t o  40 o r  50 p e r  yea r  i s  on t h e  
o r d e r  of  20 yea r s .  
Changing reactor fuel cycles--provided they are back- 
fittable into existing reactors--can be accomplished more ex- 
peditiously. Thus Indian Point 1 changed from a U-235/thorium 
fuel charge to a U-235/U-238 fuel charge early in its career 
with no difficulty. A change from present fuel cycles based on 
clean enriched uranium to one using radioactive U-233 will 
depend on the rate at which reprocessing plants and remote fuel 
fabrication facilities can be built and shaken down. This 
should not take more than five years (although under present 
conditions in OECD countries it is likely to take ten). 
IV. ECONOMIC FACTORS IN INTRODUCING NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
It has been observed by J.C. Fisher and R.B. Pry [8] that 
the substitution of one technology for another follows a 
particularly simple law. If fl is the market fraction of an old 
technology, and f2 the fraction of a new technology 
where A is a constant, t is time. This generalization was shown 
to hold for 17 technical substitutions ranging from synthetic/ 
natural rubber to BOF/open hearth steels. 
Marchetti [9] applied the Fisher-Pry concept to the sub- 
stitution of different primary energy sources (wood, coal, oil, 
gas) and showed that the same regularities exist. 
V. Peterka [I 01 , . using an observation made in 3:961 by 
Mansfield [Ill that the rate of technical change is positively 
correlated with the profitability of the new technology, and 
negatively influenced by the relative capital investment needed 
to introduce the new technology, developed a theory which ac- 
counted for the Fisher-Pry observations, and related the sub- 
stitution constant A to the production costs and capital in- 
vestments of the competing technologies. 
The basic equation of the Peterka theory is, if Pi(t) is 
the rate of production of the ith competing technology (Peterka, 
Equ. 4.2) 
where a is the specific investment for commodity i (capital i 
needed to increase the production rate by one unit), ci is the 
specific firoduction costs (costs, including cepital charges, of 
producing is the market price of a unit of pro- 
duction. 
For power plants Pi is in kilowatts, ai is in $/kW and it 
is convenient to express p and c in $/kWyear. i 
This equation asserts that a producer's investment in tech- 
nology i on the average will equal his return from production 
using technology i. 
It is plain that in the long run a producer cannot invest 
in a technology more -than his return--he cannot subsidize it 
indefinitely. Further, if he wishes to retain his market share 
in a growing economy, he must continue to invest. 
Equations (1) are intuitively of the right form--the in- 
crement of production being proportional to the present pro- 
duction, and the observations of Mansfield are nicely incor- 
porated. 
Conceptual difficulties* on how utilities make decisions on 
which technology to adopt (for example if a - i - i < c why is j 
any of technology j purchased?) could probably be eliminated by 
a more elaborate theory incorporating: 
a) Variations in costs for different utilities for each 
technology, 
b) uncertainties in all the cost parameters, and/or 
C) a non-deterministic decision-making model. 
We therefore adopt the Peterka equations as a working 
hypothesis, and see what light they shed on the LWR-fossil sub- 
stitution which we are currently observing in the U.S. 
First, we rewrite (1) as follows: 
Summing over i 
at any time t all the quantities with subscripts are known, 
d In P(t)/dt may be estimated from long-term trends, and p is 
then determined. We can then go back to ( 2 )  and find 
d In Pi(t)/dt. By iternation one can advance th~ough time. 
*pointed out by Dr. A.M. Perry 
Usua l ly  o u r  knowledge o f  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  a s  a f u n c t i o n  o f  t i m e  
i s  n o t  p r e c i s e  enough t o  w a r r a n t  such  a p r o c e d u r e .  
I t  i s  wor th  t a k i n g  a moment t o  compare t h i s  p r o c e d u r e  w i t h  
a s t a n d a r d  l i n e a r  programming approach .  F o r  example, t h e  HEDL 
l i n e a r  program, i n  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  economic c o m p e t i t i o n  between 
d i f f e r e n t  r e a c t o r  t y p e s ,  i n t r o d u c e s  new r e a c t o r  t y p e s  as soon 
a s  t h e i r  e l e c t r i c i t y  c o s t s  are lower  t h a n  t h o s e  of  a n  e x i s t i n g  
type .  The i n i t i a l  rate of  i n t r o d u c t i o n  i s  l i m i t e d  (e.g.  t o  
1 , 2 , 4 , 8 , 1 6  e v e r y  biennium) b u t  t h i s  l i m i t a t i o n  i s  n o t  r e l a t e d  
t o  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  economic advan tage ;  a3smal l  a d v a n t a g e  h a s  t h e  
same e f f e c t  as a l a r g e  advan tage .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e r e  i s  no d i s -  
t i n c t i o n  between h i g h  and low c a p i t a l  c o s t  sys tems.  
Under t h e  P e t e r k a  f o r m u l a t i o n  a r a p i d  growth of  a new 
techno logy  r e q u i r e s  a l a r g e  economic advan tage- - l a rge  compared 
t o  t h e  u n i t  c a p i t a l  c o s t  r e q u i r e d .  To a f i r s t  approx imat ion  
( P e t e r k a  Equ. 5.12) t h i s  i s  e x p r e s s e d  by (a2 f a l )  
L e t  u s  f i r s t  t a k e  t h e  case a 2  = a l  = a .  Then t h e  second t e r m  
d i s a p p e a r s  on  t h e  T i g h t  and t h e  s o l u t i o n  i s  e x a c t  
I f  cl-c2 i s  s m a l l  compared t o  a ,  t h e  ra te  o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n  
w i l l  b e  s m a l l .  To g e t  a f e e l  f o r  t h i s  e x p r e s s i o n  refer t o  t h e  
l a s t  formula  i n  A-3 which g i v e s  t h e  BWR burn-up c o s t s .  The 
terms i n  X and Y f o r  X = 100, Y = 60 (which migh t  d e s c r i b e  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  l a t e  i n  t h i s  c e n t u r y )  c o n t r i b u t e  $35 t o  t h e  a n n u a l  
o p e r a t i n g  c o s t  (5 .3  mi l l s /kWh) .  If w e  were t o  i n t r o d u c e  a new 
s y s t m ,  c o s t i n g  $700/kW which comple te ly  e l i m i n a t e s  t h e  .burn-up 
c o s t s ,  and none o f  t h e  o t h e r  c o s t s  w e r e  i n c r e a s e d  as a r e s u l t ,  
t h e  new sys tem would grow a t  t h e  rate  
The r a t i o  f 2 / f l  would i n c r e a s e  by a f a c t o r  e i n  20 y e a r s .  I f  
t h e  i n i t i a l  p e n e t r a t i o n  w e r e  2 % ,  it would o n l y  b e  5% i n  20 y e a r s .  
Only when Y is  l a r g e  w i l l  t h e  p e n e t r a t i o n  b e  r a p i d .  
I f  t h e  new sys tem h a s  a  l a r g e r  c a p i t a l  c o s t  t h a n  t h e  BWR, 
t h e  t e r m  
i s  n e g a t i v e  and t h e  market  p e n e t r a t i o n  r a t e  i s  slowed down 
f u r t h e r .  
Now l e t  u s  a n a l y z e  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  s i k u a t i o n  between base-  
l o a d  f o s s i l  and LWR p l a n t s  i n  t h e  U.S. now a n d . i n  t h e  y e a r  2000 
w i t h  t h e  a i d  o f  t h e  P e t e r k a  model, and see whether  w e  c a n  ob- 
t a i n  a  c o n s i s t e n t  p i c t u r e .  
Economic Balance  Between LWR and F o s s i l  P l a n t s  i n  1978 
I n  t h e  Appendix a n  e q u a t i o n  i s  d e r i v e d  f o r  t h e  annua l  
o p e r a t i n g  c o s t  o f  a  BWR on a  once-through f u e l  c y c l e  ( s u b s c r i p t  
one  r e f e r s  t o  LWRs) 
The te rms  r e p r e s e n t ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y  
c = c a p i t a l  c h a r g e s  + f u e l  p r o c e s s i n g  + o p e r a t i o n  and 
maintenance  + (heavy m e t a l  c o s t s )  . 
X = u n i t  p r i c e  o f  s e p a r a t i v e  work, $-kgu. 
Y = u n i t  p r i c e  of  yel low-cake,  $/lbu3O8. 
I n  t h e  f u e l  p r o c e s s i n g  and heavy me ta l  c o s t s ,  i n v e n t o r y  
c h a r g e s  a r e  i n c l u d e d  A t  10%. The e x p r e s s i o n  may be  exp re s se d  
more c o n v e n i e n t l y  a s  
S i m i l a r l y  f o r  f o s s i l  p l a n t s  ( s u b s c r i p t  z e r o )  
where 
Z = f o s s i l  f u e l  c o s t ,  $ /mi l l i on  b t u .  
(-9000 btu/kWh, 75% c a p a c i t y  f a c t o r ) .  
C a p i t a l  c o s t s  f o r  26 o p e r a t i n g  U . S .  LWR p l a n t s  o f  over  
500 M W e  r a t i n g ,  completed between 1972 and 1977, c a n  be  co r r e -  
l a t e d  w i t h  an exp res s ion  
$/kW = A (1.22) C.M. R-0.35 I 
C.M. = mean yea r  o f  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  R = r a t i n g  ( M W ) .  
The 26 p l a n t s  have n e t  c o s t s  between 150 and 6 9 0 $ / k ~ ,  w i t h  
a  median of $350/kW. W e  choose t h i s  a s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  c o s t  
o f  ou r  e x i s t i n g  n u c l e a r  park,  and $ 2 0 0 / k ~  a s  t h e  c o s t  of  ou r  
e x i s t i n g  f o s s i l  park .  Nuclear f u e l  c o s t s  f o r  f u e l  now i n  
r e a c t o r s  a r e  X = 60, Y = 20. Average f o s s i l  f u e l  c o s t s  are 
about  Z = $1.20/mill .btu.  S u b s t i t u t i n g  i n  t h e  p rev ious  equa- 
t i o n s  f o r  cl and co 
I n  1977 approximately  12% of  a l l  e l e c t r i c i t y  gene ra t ed  i n  
t h e  U . S .  w a s  nuclear .  The nuc l ea r  f r a c t i o n  of t h e  base-loaded 
p l a n t s  w a s  h ighe r ,  approximately  15%. Thus f l  = 0.15, f o  = 0.85. 
The c u r r e n t  growth r a t e  of  e l e c t r i c  c a p a b i l i t y  is  i: = 0.055. 
P u t t i n g  t h e s e  valuCs i n t o  Equat ion ( 3 )  and s o l v i n g  f o r  p  
w e  f i n d  
Then 
Projecting P1 and P forward, noting that 
P1 (end 1977) = 46 GWe 
P1 (end 2000) = 459 
P (end 2000) = 1063 . 
Our trial Oalue for f1 in 2000 is then 0.43. 
Economic Balance in 2000 Between LWR and Fossil Plants 
Equation (4) shows that nuclear power plant costs have been 
escalating at a rate of 22%/year, which is much faster than 
general inflation. A similar phenomenon has been observed with 
fossil power plants. We expect that this super-inflation of 
construction costs, which'has complex causes, will slow down- 
-perhaps eventually stop--but it is not yet finished. 
The Economic Ground Rules used in U.S. NASFP evaluations 
quotes (deflated) capital costs of LWRs as $625/kWe, including 
interest during construction, and capital charges (also deflated) 
of 10%. If in fact the super-inflation were to continue 
through 2000 at as little as 2%/year, as opposed to the past ex- 
perience of 15%/year, this procedure will underestimate capital 
charges by a factor of 1.6 by 2000. To avoid this we make the 
following explicit (and optimistic) assumption: LWR power 
plant costs will continue to inflate in constant 1978$ to a 
level of $1000/kW but not increase beyond this value. This 
might be thought of as a continuation of the super-inflation 
for 3.5 years, or as a continuous creeping super-inflation of 
2%/year. We assume that fossil power plant costs will behave 
the same way. (Note that we use the slightly higher value of 
12.5% for the deflated cost of capital for depreciating assets, 
10% for non-depreciating assets). 
On this basis we take a (2000) = $1000/kW (in 1978$), 1 
ao(2000) = $800/kW. Fuel costs are taken as X = $100/kg sep. 
work, Y = $60/lb yellow-cake, Z = $2.50/million btu. fl = 0.43, 
f2 = 0.57. We assume dt In has slowed to 5%. 
We then find cl = 181, co = 253, p = 270 
d In PI 
There is no fundamental reason the values of dt in 
1978 and 2000 should agree: each depends on a monetary compe- 
titive situation. Further, the cost assumptions are far too 
uncertain for us to take the exact values of the growth coeffi- 
cients for PI literally. Nevertheless the average of these 
values predicts the LVJR capcity in the year 2000 to be 400 GWe. 
This is unlikely to be far wrong, and gives the insight that the 
present low projected growth of LWRs reflects primarily economic, 
and only secondarily sociological or political forces. 
This exercise shows that the Peterka model can account for 
observed economic trends, and suggests that it has some value 
as a predictive device. We shall now use it to investigate the 
substitution of LMFRRs (subscript two) for LWRs. 
Since we are interested in the penetration of a new 
reactor into an established market, f is usually small and we 2 
further simplify Equation (3) by setting f2 = 0. Then 
(approximate 
Since a2 - > a ,  c2 < c this will overestimate p and hence 1 
market penetration rates. (If necessary the error can easily be 
rectified when f2 becomes appreciable by returning to (3)). 
Then 
Economic Balance After 2000 Between LWR and LMFBR 
We have from the appendix the following relations 
c = 0.125a2 + 28.12 + 0.023X + 0.081Y 2 LMFBR 
BWR-recycle will be more economic than BWR-once-through when 
which is almost the case when Y = 20, X = 60. Thus for all 
future values of X and Y it will be more economical. Since 
obviously there will be no LMFBRs unless Pu is available, we 
shall compare LMFBRs with recycle BWRs. 
Then we have 
and for X = 100, which we will henceforth assume 
We remark in the first place that if the capital cost of fast 
breeders exceeds that of LWRs by $200/kW fast breeders do not 
become economical until Y is approximately $100/lb (1978$). 
Following our earlier discussion, let us take P(1995) 
= 900 GWe. We consider two scenarios: total nuclear power in- 
stallation in 2030, 5000 GWe (low growth) and 10,000 GWe (high 
growth). Overall average growth rates are respectively 4.9% 
and 6.9%. We take P2(1995) = 10 GWe. 
Table 5 gives the approximate number of LMFBRs which would 
be installed in 2030 according to the Peterka formulation using 
the values of cl and c2 previously calculated, and taking 
Table 5. Economic penetration of LMFBRs by 2030 
(Initial value = 10 GWe in 1995) 
Nuclear growth: 10,000 GWe in 2030 5,000 GWe in 2030 
all numbers in 1978$ 
"1 = capital cost of BMRs $/kPJ 
a2 = capital cost of LMFBRSs $/k~ 
Y = cost of yellow-cake $/lb 
X = separative work cost = $100/SWU 
The approximate  fo rmula  ( 6 )  was used u n l e s s  p e n e t r a t i o n s  were 
l a r g e r  t h a n  12$,  where mom e x a c t  f o r m u l a t i o n s  were used.  
W e  o b s e r v e  from t h i s  t a b l e  t h a t  market  p e n e t r a t i o n  i s  
markedly slowed by h i g h  c a p i t a l  c o s t s ,  and even more s o  by a 
c a p i t a l  c o s t  d i s a d v a n t a g e  o f  a s  l i t t l e  a s  20%. I n  t h e  1000/ 
1200 c a s e ,  which may b e  t h e  m o s t  l i k e l y ,  even a s t r o n o m i c a l  
uranium p r i c e s  a r e  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  p roduce  s i g n i f i c a n t  LMFBR 
p e n e t r a t i o n  i n  35 y e a r s .  (Note t h a t  v e r y  f a v o r a b l e  f u e l  pro-  
c e s s i n g  c o s t  a s sumpt ions  have been made f o r  t h e  LMFBR.) 
The d r i v i n g  f o r c e  i n  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  c a s e s  i s  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  
i n  uranium u t i l i z a t i o n ,  and hence  u ran iu i i  c o s t s ,  less t h e  i n -  
c r e a s e  i n  i n v e n t o r y  c o s t s .  The LMFBR h a s - - a  n e g a t i v e  uranium 
u t i l i 8 a t i o n ,  b u t  i t s  i n v e n t o r y  of  5g f i s s i l e  Pu/kWe d e t e r m i n e s  
a  n e t  p o s i t i v e  component t o  LMFBR f u e l  cost from n a t u r a l  
uranium and s e p a r a t i v e  work p ~ i c e s .  S i n c e  advanced c o n v e r t e r s  
a l s o  t e n d  t o  have  i n c r e a s e d  f i s s i l e  i n v e n t o r i e s ,  and have a t  
b e s t  z e r o  uranium u t i l i z a t i o n ,  t h e  e x e r c i s e  w e  have j u s t  con- 
c l u d e d  a p p l i e s  a l s o  t o  advanced c o n v e r t e r s .  
W e  conclthde t h a t  t h e  LMFBR w i l l  n o t  a c h i e v e  s u b s t a n t i a l  
market  p e n e t r a t i o n  by t h e  y e a r  2030 thnough p u r e l y  economic 
f o r c e s  u n l e s s  
1 .  i t s  c a p i t a l  cost i s  no h i g h e r  t h a n  t h a t  o f  a n  LWR, 
and a l s o  
2. t h e  c o s t s  o f  n a t u r a l  uranium, i n  1978$ exceed $300 a t  
a n  e a r l y  d a t e ,  
The same c o n c l u s i o n s  h o l d  a  f o r t i o r i  f o r  advanced c o n v e r t e r s .  
Equa t ion  ( 4 ) ,  p .  18,  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  b u i l d i n g  LMFBRs i n  
l a r g e r  s i z e  t h a n  competing LWRs c o u l d  h e  a  way o f  improving 
t h e i r  economics. Assume ( 4 )  a p p l i e s  a s  w e l l  f o r  LMFBRs and 
f o r  a l l  r a t i n g s  up t o  -5 GWe. I f  LMFBRs c o s t  20% more t h a n  
LWRs a t  e q u a l  r a t i n g s ,  b u i l d i n g  t h e  fo rmer  1 .7  t i m e s  l a r g e r  
t h a n  t h e  l a t t e r  would r e d u c e  t h e  c o s t  d i s a d v a n t a g e  t o  z e r o .  
T h i s  may b e  w e l l  w i t h i n  t h e  r a n g e  o f  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  s i n c e  LMFBRs 
do  n o t  have t o  con tend  w i t h  s i z e  l i m i t a t i o n s  on p r e s s u r e  v e s s e l s ,  
and e a r l y  LMFBR d e s i g n s  a r e  p r o b a b l y  n o t  a t  t h e  s p e c i f i c  power 
l i m i t .  (A c o s t  s p r e a d  o f  50% would r e q u i r e  a v e r a g e  LMFBR 
r a t i n g s  t o  be  3.2 t i m e s  l a r g e r  t h a n  a v e r a g e  LWR r a t i n g ,  which 
would p robab ly  t a k e  a n o t h e r  10 y e a r s  t o  a c h i e v e . )  
There  a r e  two ways t h a t  government d e c i s i o n  makers c o u l d  
f o s t e r  t h e  growth of  LMFBRs, and s o  r e d u c e  dependence o n  uranium 
mining.  The f i r s t  i s  t o  s u b s i d i z e  e a r l y  c r e a t i o n  o f  a n  LMFBR 
i n d u s t r y .  I f  20 G W e  of  UWBRs w e r e  o p e r a t i n g  i n  1995 i n s t e a d  
o f  10 G W e ,  t h e  1995 i n d u s t r i a l  b a s e  would b e  t w i c e  a s  l a r g e  and 
s u c c e s s i v e  a n n u a l  i n c r e m e n t s  would b e  doubled .  Note t h a t  t h e  
l a t e r  a n  a c c e l e r a t i o n  program i s  s t a r t e d ,  t h e  more e x p e n s i v e  it 
w i l l  be .  
Second, o n e  c o u l d  e n v i s a g e  a  t a x  o n  n a t u r a l  uranium 
( a p p l i e d  a f t e r  e s s e n t i a l l y  a l l  c e n t r a l  s t a t i o n  power p l a n t s  a r e  
n u c l e a r )  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  economic i n c e n t i v e  t o  c o n v e r t  from 
LWRs t o  LMFBRs. 
Back -F i t t ab l e  Improvements i n  Neutron-Economy 
The P e t e r k a  model a g r e e s  w i t h  t h e  h i s t o r y  of change of  
energy t e c h n o l o g i e s ,  t h a t  it t a k e s  t i m e  f o r  a  new techno logy  
t o  grow t o  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  c a p a c i t y .  I t  adds  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  
t h a t  r a p i d  market  p e n e t r a t i o n  (10 t o  50% i n  t e n  y e a r s )  can  be  
expec ted  i f  t h e  cost improvements a r e  l a q e  compared t o  t h e  
c a p i t a l  needed t o  implement them ( s p e c i f i c a l l y  i f  Ac/a - > 0.22a ) .  
I n  t h i s  l i g h t ,  l e t  u s  look a t  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  BRW re- 
c y c l e  when X = 100 and Y = 60. The f u e l  c o s t  advan tage  betQeen 
BY7R-OT .and BWR r e c y c l e  is $5.40 kWyr. 
Assuming a  1500 ton /y r  r e p r o c e s s i n g  p l a n t  costs $ 2  b i l l i o n ,  
and s e r v i c e s  50 GWe,  t h e  added c a p i t a l  c o s t  i s  $ 4 0 / k ~ e .  The 
r e l a t i v e  r a t e s  o f  i n t r o d u c t i o n  a r e  
A t  t h e  p r e s e n t  t i m e ,  world  r e p r o c e s s i n g  r equ i r emen t s  f o r  
LWR f u e l s  is  2400 t ons /yea r .  Perhaps  10% o f  t h i s  amount is  
opera t ing . .  Then a t  Y = 60, i n  16 y e a r s  50% o f  a l l  LWR f u e l s  
would be  r e p r o c e s s e d  and r eused  i n  LWRs. A t  Y = 100, t h i s  
would t a k e  o n l y  8  1/2 y e a r s .  
With Pu and U r e c y c l e ,  uranium u t i l i z a t i o n  for  a  1000 M W e  
LWR d r o p s  from 196 t o n s  Uj08/yr t o  123 t o n s / y r .  Now suppose  
a  f u r t h e r  b a c k - f i t t a b l e  f u e l  change,  i n v o l v i n g  some r a c t o r  
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  cou ld  r educe  t h e  f u e l  u t i l i z a t i o n  a n o t h e r  
60 t ons /y r  ( t o  approx imate ly  1/3 i t s  p r e s e n t  v a l u e ) .  Assuming 
no i n c r e a s e  i n  i n v e n t o r y ,  and no i n c r e a s e  i n  s e p a r a t i v e  work 
c o s t s - - t h i s  would r e s u l t  i n  s a v i n g  o f  $0.12~/kWyr.  The c a p i t a l  
c o s t s  might  b e  $50/kW i n  d i r e c t  c o s t s  and $100/kW f o r  one y e a r  
l o s t  i n  production--$150/kW. Then 
~t would t a k e  27 and 1 4  y e a r s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  t o  go from 10 
to  50% s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h i s  improvement. 
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APPENDIX 
Fuel Cycle Costs for BWR (Once-Through) 
BWR (Pu Recycle) and LMFBR (Producing U-223) 
Assumptions (constant 1978$) 
Capacity factors, all reactors 
Capital charges on depreciating assets 
Capital charges on non-depreciating assets 10% 
Fabrication costs of LWR fuel (U-235/28) $300/kg H.M.* 
Throwaway cost of spent fuel $115/kg H.M.* 
Rep~ocessing and waste disposal costs of 
spent fuel $220/kg H.M.* 
Separative work costs "X" Now $ 601kg U 
Post-1980 $100/kg U 
Yellow-cake sots "Y" Now (avg. US) $ 20 
1980-2000 $ 60 
Post-2000 > $200 
0.2% 
$ 4/kg U 
4 + 2.60 Y 
Tails fraction 
Transformation cost, U-UF6 
Cost of U as UF6 (.$/kg U) 
* 
These values are from NASAP 
Value of Pu = 0.8 value of U-235 in 2.8% 
fuel minus $5/g fabrication cost penalty 
Value of U-233 = 1.1 value of U-235 in 2.82% 
fuel 
Operating and maintenance costs, all reactors $ 5/kW 
Fabrication and reprocessing costs of LMFBR luel: 
set to make LMFBR fuel cycle cost = BWR 
recycle fuel cost when X = 60 Y = 20 
Properties of BWR 
Initial enrichment 2.82% 235 
Final enrichment 
Burnup 
Specific power 
Thermal efficiency 
Out-of-pile inventory 
0.8% 235 
0.5% Pu (fissile) 
28,000 MWd/ton H.M. 
30 kWt/kg H.M. 
33% 
0.2 cores 
Properties of LMFBR 
Burnup 75,000 MWd/ton 
Thermal efficiency 38% 
Average inventory 5g Pu/kWe (fissile) 
Excess fuel produced per year 0.210g U-233/kWe 
Side-Calculation: Values of BWR Fuel Components 
To produce 1 kg U @ 2.82% U-235, 0.2% tails 
.feed= 5.137 kg U separative work= 3.920 kg U 
To produce 1 kg U @ 0.8% U-235, 0.2% tails 
:feed = 1.176 kg U separative work = 0.105 kg U 
Cost of 1 kg 2.82% U = 3.920X + 5.137 (4 + 2.60Y) 
Value of Ig contained U-235 = 0.139X + 0.182 (4 + 2.60Y) 
Value of Ig Pu fissile = 0.111X + 0.146 (4 + 2.60Y) - 5 
Value of 1 kg 0.8% U = 1.105X + 1.176 (4 + 2.60Y) 
Value of Ig U-233 = 0.153X + 0.200 (4 + 2.60Y) 
BWR Once-Through Cycle 
Burnup costs associated with heavy metals 
Each kg fuel produces 28 MWd = 28 x 8000 kWhe 
One kWyear @ 75% C.F. = 8766 x 0.75 = 6574.5 hrs. 
6574*5 = .02935 kg fuel . 1 kWyear uses 28x8000
t.02935) cost of 1 kg 2.82% U 
= 0.115X + 0.1508 (4 + 2.60Y) $/kWyear 
Burnup costs associated with fuel processing 
Fuel fabrication $100/kg 
Fuel throw-away ' $1 1,5'/kg 
$21 5/kg 
Inventory costs associated with heavy metals 
Average in-core inventory value = 0.5 initial value 
Out-of-core inventory value = - 0.2 initial value 
0.7 n II 
Inventory value = 0.7 (3.920X + 5.137(4 + 2.60~)) $/kg 
Capital charge = O.lO/yr; kWe/kg fuel = 10 
Annual inventory charge = 0.0274X + .0360(4 + 2.60Y) $/kWa 
Inventory costs associated with fuel processing 
Average fabrication value = 0.7 x 100 = $70/kg 
1 Annual inventory charge 70 x 0.1 x - = 0.70 $/kWa 10 
Annual once-through BWR costs: (al = capital cost $/kP?e) 
0.125al + 7.01 + 5.0 + {.142X+ .187(4 + 2.60~)) 
Capital charges + fuel processing+ operating & maintenance 
+ (heavy metal costs) 
BWR, Pu and U recycle 
Burnup costs associated with heavy metals 
Initial value 3.920X + 5.137 (4 + 2.60Y) $/kg 
Residual values 
0.8% u 0.105X + 1.176(4 + 2.60~) $/kg 
5 g .Pu 0.555X + 0.73 (4 + 2.6'OY) - 25 $/kq 
Net cost = 25 + 3.26X + 3.231 (4 -+ 2.60Y) $/kg 
= 0.734 + 0.0957x + 0.0948 (4 + 2.60~) $/kWyr 
Burnup costs associated with fuel processing 
Fuel fabrication 100 $/kg 
Fuel reprocessing + waste disposal 220 $/kg 
320 $/kg 
I n v e n t o r y  costs a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  h e a v y  metals 
I n v e n t o r y  = 0 . 7  ( i n i t i a l  v a l u e )  + 0 . 5  ( r e s i d u a l  v a l u e s )  = 
0 . 7  (3 .920X + 5 . 1 3 7 ( 4  + 2 . 6 0 ~ ) )  
0 . 5  (0.105X + 1 . 1 7 6 ( 4  + 2 . 6 0 ~ ) )  
0 . 5  ( 0 . 5 5 5 ~  + 0 . 7 3  (4 + 2.60Y) - 2 5 )  
3.074X + 4.549C4 + 2.60Y) - 1 2 . 5  $ / k g  
0.0307X + 0 . 0 4 5 5 ( 4  + 2.60Y) - 0 . 1 2 5  $ / k g  
I n v e n t o r y  costs a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  f u e l  p r o c e s s i n g  
A v e r a g e  f ab r i ca t i on  v a l u e  = 0 .7  x 1 0 0  = $ 7 0 / k g  
A n n u a l  i n v e n t o r y  c h a r g e  0 . 7 0  $ / k g  
A n n u a l  r e c y c l e  BWR costs  
0 . 1 2 5 ~ ~  + 1 0 . 0 9  + 5 . 0  + (0 .1264X + 0 . 1 4 0 3 ( 4  + 2.60Y) + . 6 0 9 )  
LMFBR 
F u e l  p r o d u c t i o n  c red i t  
I n  o n e  y e a r ,  p r o d u c e s  a t  7 5 %  C.F. 0 . 2 1 0 9  U-233/kW or  a v a l u e  o f  
0 . 2 1 0 ( 0 . 1 5 3 ~  + 0 . 2 0 0 ( 4  + 2 . 6 0 ~ ) )  $/kWa 
= 0.0321X + 0 . 0 4 2 ( 4  + 2.60Y) $/kWa 
I n v e n t o r y  c h a r g e s  f o r  
5 9  Pu/kWe = 0.555X + 0 . 7 3 ( 4  + 2.60Y) - 2 5  x 1 0 %  
= -0.0555X + 0 . 0 7 3  ( 4  + 2.60Y) - 2 . 5  $/kWa 
T o t a l  h e a v y  m e t a l  a s s o c i a t e d  costs  ( i n v e n t o r y  c h a r g e s  m i n u s  
c r e d i t s )  
0.0234X + 0 . 0 3 1 ( 4  + 2.60Y) - 2 . 5  $ /kFa  
Now t o  g e t  t h e  LPWBR costs a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  f u e l  processing, c a l l  
t h e m  A. Assume per page 1 of t h i s  a p p e n d i x  
A n n u a l  ~ e c y c l e  BWR f u e l  costs  = 
A n n u a l  LMFBR f u e l  costs when X = 6 0 ,  Y = 20  
1 0 . 0 9  + ( 0 . 1 2 6 4 ~  + 0 . 1 4 0 3 ( 4  + 2.60Y) + 0 . 6 0 9 )  = 26 .14  
= A + ( 0 . 0 2 3 4 ~  + 0 . 0 3 1 ( 4  + 2.60Y) - 2 . 5 )  
A = 26.14 - 0 .64  = 25 .50  
A n n u a l  LMFBR costs  (genera l )  
~ ~ ( 0 . 1 2 5 )  + 25.50 + 5 + f 0 . 0 2 3 4 ~  + 0 . 0 3 1 ( 4  + 2.60Y) - 2.51 
